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As the United States improves its collective awareness and emergency 
preparedness in the face of increased terrorist activity, more efforts are being made to 
create and enhance community readiness for catastrophic events.  There have been 
substantial efforts to improve the nation’s bioterrorism preparedness.  Better planning, 
equipment, training, surveillance, and pharmaceutical caches have elevated the nation’s 
readiness for biological attacks.  In order to effectively meet the challenges created by a 
bioterrorism attack, its first lines of defense, the first responders, must be rapidly 
prophylaxed to allow the continuance of their mission.   
Many states and localities have tackled the gigantic undertaking of mass 
prophylaxis plans to provide chemoprophylaxis to civilians should the need arise.  Many 
cities have developed and tested their plans to provide general public mass prophylaxis.  
It is assumed, or briefly mentioned, that the mass prophylaxis of first responders will 
occur, but few plans have been developed.  The primary objective of this research is to 
develop, test, and make recommendations for a straightforward, adaptable mass 
prophylaxis plan to meet the prophylactic requirements of local first responders in the 
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In the United States citizens rely heavily on first responders to meet their needs in 
the face of an emergency.  Fire, law enforcement, ambulance transport, and hospital 
personnel, are all part of the emergency response system that they depend on in the face 
of a crisis.  Much planning has gone into meeting the public’s needs during a bioterrorism 
attack, but little has been done to ensure that first responders will be adequately 
prophylaxed.   
Personal protective equipment such as masks, gloves, purified air systems and 
detection instrumentation is increasing along with education and training for first 
responders, but chemoprophylaxis needs to be satisfactorily addressed.  This has not been 
an intentional omission; much has been achieved considering budget, time, and personnel 
limitations.  The availability of necessary antibiotics and immunizations for a 
bioterrorism attack has increased exponentially over the last ten years.  The Strategic 
National Stockpile (SNS), Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) and local 
stockpiles and caches have greatly improved access for chemoprophylaxis.  It is a plan to 
deliver, educate, and administer the required chemoprophylaxis specifically to first 
responders that is missing.  The definition of first responder for the scope of this thesis 
includes fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and hospital providers.   
 
A. PURPOSE 
The goal of terrorists is to disrupt the democratic society; therefore, failure to 
provide timely prophylaxis to first responders in a bioterrorism attack will magnify the 
chaos sure to ensue.  Most bioterrorism planning assumes that first responders will be 
prophylaxed at the point they are included in response planning.  The greatest inclusion is 
a brief reference to the need for rapid first responder’s prophylaxis without a means to 
achieve the protection.   
The public depends on a ready first responder work force in the face of a 
bioterrorism event.  But without plans for mass prophylaxis, timely dispensing of first 
responder chemoprophylaxis is doubtful.  Developing a hospital-based first responder 
mass-prophylaxis plan will provide more coordinated prophylaxis distribution to first 
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responders and may decrease disease incidence, severity, and mortality, and allow first 
responders to be available for their designated roles in a bioterrorism event. 
Providing protection to the community’s guardians allows first responders to 
proceed with their duties in detection, mitigation, preparedness, and response to daily and 
catastrophic events.  The purpose of this thesis is to develop and test a mass prophylaxis 
plan that addresses the needs of local first responders in the event of a biological terrorist 
attack.  It must be a model consistent with current hospital emergency incident command 
plans that can be used as a template by other hospitals, or as an annex to communitywide 
planning, to provide protection for their first responders.  
Much time and effort has gone into large-scale mass prophylaxis plans to create 
scenarios that address the needs of the public in the face of a bioterrorism release.  
Reference on perceived need, timing, and type of chemoprophylaxis has abounded from 
trusted and reliable sources including The Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), World Health Organization (WHO), and many leading healthcare researchers in 
the county.  (MMWR Recommendations and Reports.  April 4, 2003).  Software 
programs, such as Maxi-Vac, assist with determination of staffing needs in a general 
public mass prophylaxis clinic.  (Smallpox Vaccination Clinic Guide.  Annex 3-7.  2002).  
This CDC example model states that it “assumes that clinics can be operating at near full 
efficiency to meet vaccination goals once the decision to offer voluntary vaccination is 
made.”  Many reviewed plans work on the assumption that these staff members, often 
first responders, will have been previously prophylaxed.   
Mixing first responders into a mass prophylaxis arena delays their availability in a 
potentially critical need period.  In “Vaccination Ventures” (Pine, 2003) under the 
challenges section it was hypothesized that vaccination staff would be arriving with the 
masses to be vaccinated first.  These staff members would be meeting the same problems 
as the public with congestion, parking, communication, and potential exposure from 
contaminated population.    
Location can be integral to plan effectiveness.  The CDC Strategic National 
Stockpile Guide states that an increased number of smaller dispensing sites could reduce 
congestion and safety concerns (SNS Guide).  The State of California Mass Prophylaxis 
Planning Guide (Sacramento, 2003)  recommends the use of Fast Track Clinics within the 
site to accommodate medical personnel, public health, and first responders, which would 
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help segregate them from the public, but provides no further direction and relies on this 
same workforce to provide the medication. 
There can be major differences in planning and practice.  Experience-based 
protocols can provide lessons learned for mass prophylaxis planning.  New York City 
anthrax mass antibiotic prophylaxis, (Blank, 2003), and Shiprock, New Mexico 
community responses to epidemics, such as meningitis, measles, hanta-virus, and plague, 
(Houk, 2003), provide experiential lessons that can be applied to future planning.  
Having a hospital-based decentralized chemoprophylaxis site for a federally 
declared bioterrorism event geared to first responders will increase manageability by 
simplifying logistics.  Traffic, patient flow, site familiarity, communication, and non-SNS 
dependent stockpiles can all contribute to more rapid dispensing and personnel 
turnaround.   
 
B. THESIS ARGUMENTS 
This thesis argues the need for a separate first responder mass prophylaxis site 
and plan from the generalized public mass prophylaxis site and plan that addresses the 
first responder’s specific needs and rapid prophylaxis.  The provision of rapid protection 
allows their availability to meet the community’s medical and safety needs.  Placing first 
responders into public mass prophylaxis sites forces them to face the logistical chaos 
associated with any large-scale event.  The author also explores the state and regulatory 
requirements associated with medication and vaccine dispensing to ensure compliance 
with large-scale mass prophylaxis clinic venues. 
Developing a first responder plan separate from general public mass prophylaxis 
plans places additional requirements on emergency planners, but this thesis proposes that 
the advantages to separating first responders from a venue designed for thousands, 
hundreds of thousands, or millions of recipients, far outweigh the additional effort. 
The broader purpose of this thesis is to develop a first responder mass prophylaxis 
pan that not only will provide protection against a host of pathogen threats to Orange 
County, California, but also will be adaptable to communities across the United States.  
Chapter II examines requirements for first responder mass prophylaxis, including 
state and federal regulatory requirements.  Chapter III outlines a first responder mass 
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prophylaxis plan including dispensing stations, associated documentation, traffic-flow 
patterns and aftercare.  Chapter IV reviews implementation of the plan in a first 
responder mass prophylaxis exercise and includes debriefings, hot washes, evaluations 
and recommended changes to the plan.  Chapter V presents a summary, conclusions, and 


















II. REQUIREMENTS FOR FIRST RESPONDER MASS 
PROPHYLAXIS 
Terrorists have used biological attacks throughout history to achieve varying 
objectives.  With the eradication of smallpox and the advent of antibiotics and vaccines, 
biological assaults had been long thought of as an outdated and minor threat.  The 2001 
anthrax attacks opened the public’s eyes to the very real threat bioterrorism presents in 
the modern world.  Authorities now agree that a single case of smallpox would be a 
worldwide emergency.  (www.cdc.gov) 
Defining plan requirements assists in meeting mass prophylaxis objectives.  
Developing a plan consistent with the incident command system mandated by Joint 
Commission and Hospital Accreditation (JCAHO) for hospitals and utilized by fire and 
law enforcement agencies is imperative to provide protection to first responders in the 
event of a biological release.  The following are the necessary planning factors that will 
increase the effectiveness of first responder protection: 
• The plan needs to be flexible enough for use with various agents 
• The plan needs to be able to be adapted to fit with existing emergency 
preparedness plans 
• The plan needs to provide for rapid implementation in the event of a 
bioterrorism attack 
• The plan needs to take hospital budget limitations for plan development 
and trials into account 
• The plan must use reliable sources as its basis 
• The plan must comply with state and federal requirements 
 
A. PLAN FLEXIBILITY 
Flexible emergency planning has evolved from individual scenario planning to an 
all-hazards approach.  So, too, must bioterrorism planning.  The more scenarios the plan 
addresses, the higher its value.  Community planners must develop a basic template that 
can be adjusted to the requirements of each threat or combination of threats.   
The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) provides guidance 
for flexible application as it is designed for the wide range of man-made, naturally 
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occurring, and terrorist planned situations.  Developing a flexible plan eliminated the 
need for dozens of variations to a common problem, building on commonalities of the 
situations instead of their unique features (www.ems.gov).   
To meet most needs of chemoprophylaxis the plan must address both vaccines for 
viral pathogens and antibiotics for bacterial weapons of mass destruction.  Examples 
include vaccinia vaccine for smallpox and oral ciprofloxacin for anthrax. 
 
B. PLAN ADAPTABILITY 
As with plan flexibility, having a plan that is adaptable, that can be used by an 
entire community, and is replicatable in other communities, increases its usefulness.  
Simplicity and clarity of objectives and functions that meet first responder, agency, and 
regulatory requirements allows more hospitals to adopt the plan, improving 
interoperability with varying agencies and facilities 
. 
C. RAPID IMPLEMENTATION 
Bioterrorism events require a rapid community response.  Failure to act quickly 
can translate into more disease spread, and higher mortality and morbidity to first 
responders.  Although pathogen dissemination can be problematic, modern 
transportation, air travel, mass transit, and grand scale venues that contain large 
populations utilizing common heating/ventilation/air conditioning (HVAC) systems all 
can facilitate transmission of deadly pathogens.  At-risk populations able to mingle with 
fellow citizens, such as immune suppressed individuals on chemotherapy, HIV/AIDS, 
and transplant recipients are particularly vulnerable to most pathogens.   
Bioengineering allows production of large volumes, or highly virulent strains of 
common microbes such as haemophilus influenza (H-flu) or botulism, increasing the 
likelihood of successful bioterrorist attack.  All of these factors increase the need for a 
rapid response.  The at-risk population, including the immunosuppressed and the 
extremes of age, has a higher rate of contact with first responders and is historically more 
vulnerable to any organism, often becoming the first victims in an attack.  Therefore, 
rapid first responder prophylaxis not only protects first responders but may decrease 
pathogen transmission to the at-risk population. 
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D. BUDGET LIMITATIONS 
Strategic planning and budgeting are unfortunately left out of most emergency 
preparedness planning sessions.  Instead, time is often spent responding to crisis 
situations, putting off plans that may help avoid, or at least mitigate, these calamitous 
events.  The largest and most costly threat in lack of first responder mass prophylaxis 
strategic planning is not providing the protection to our first responders.  Leaving them 
vulnerable to the attack pathogen results in either their unavailability to complete the 
community mission as first responders, or work unprotected, risking disease contraction 
and possibly assisting the terrorists in spreading the disease to an even higher at-risk 
population. 
Even with the substantial Homeland Security funding, budgets are stretched to the 
limits in most healthcare settings.  Adding the strain of the new responsibility of 
providing chemoprophylaxis to first responders must be judiciously planned to provide 
the maximum amount of coverage using the least amount of money.  In the event of an 
actual pathogen release, funding from Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), federal, state, and local agencies, including the American 
Red Cross, will help defray the cost of providing first responder prophylaxis.  What has 
greater budgetary implications are the often unfunded development and testing of 
prophylaxis plans. 
Creating a strategic plan demonstrates how focused planning decreases or 
eliminates many of the encountered problems with mass prophylaxis.  Focused planning 
allows better strategies that limit bioterrorism threat potential and may even discourage 
well-organized terrorists from using biological agents due to the United States’ lessened 
bioterrorism vulnerability.  Prudent planning and using current business models, the 
analysis will help identify problem areas where further efforts may turn the weaknesses 




Disease information and treatment recommendations in the event of a 
bioterrorism attack are distributed to all first responders regardless of acceptance or 
refusal of vaccine/medication.  Information should be written and verbal and based on 
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reliable sources, trusted by both the medical and general public such as the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.  Trusted sources increase the merit of the message and 
individual acceptance.   
Easily understood references in a stressful time period of a bioterrorism attack 
improves the probability of first responders making a well-informed decision.  
Understanding of disease physiology and transmission improves the probability of 
compliance with treatment regimens and aids in limiting disease spread.  Educational 
materials should be coordinated for all agencies to avoid mixed or conflicting messages.  
(Rothstein, 2003). 
 
F. STATE AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 
Depending on the extent of the bioterrorism attack, state and federal requirements 
may be waived for a first responder mass prophylaxis clinic.  The rationale behind most 
requirements is to protect the citizens of this country and when possible, plans should 
address and meet state and federal these requirements.   
1. Board of Pharmacy Regulations 
The 2004 Lawbook for Pharmacy states in Section number 4062 that:  
…Notwithstanding Section 4059 or any other provisions of law, a 
pharmacist may, in good faith, furnish a dangerous drug or dangerous 
device in reasonable quantities without a prescription during a federal, 
state, or local emergency, to further the health and safety of the public.  A 
record containing the date, name, and address of the person to whom the 
drug or device is furnished, and the name, strength, and quantity of the 
drug or device furnished shall be maintained.  The pharmacist shall 
communicate this information to the patient’s attending physician as soon 
as possible.  Notwithstanding Section 4046 or any other provision of law, 
a person may possess a dangerous drug or dangerous device furnished 
without prescription pursuant to this section. 
 
(b) During a declared federal, state, or local emergency, the board 
may waive application of any provisions of this chapter or the regulations 
adopted pursuant to it if, in the board’s opinion, the waiver will aid in the 
protection of public health or the provision of patient care.  
 
To conform to Board of Pharmacy regulations, it is necessary to develop a 
mechanism for the collection of biographical information that captures: 
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a. Medical history 
i.  Past medical history 
ii. Current medications  
iii. Allergies 
b. First responder consultation with appropriate personnel 
c. Type medication/immunization dispensed 
d. Written aftercare for continued monitoring and complete course of therapy for 
oral chemoprophylaxis or wound care and local reaction for vaccinations 
e. First responder consent 
2. Ryan White Act  
The Ryan White Act was enacted by Congress in 1990 to ensure proper 
notification of emergency response employees (Fire fighters, paramedics, and emergency 
medical technicians) of exposure and proper reporting guidelines to infectious diseases.  
The Act included the existence of a designated official or officer of all emergency 
response employees in the state.  These designated officials or officers are key in 
continuing care in a first responder mass prophylaxis scenario allowing for secure and 
confidential communication of therapeutic regimens in the event of a bioterrorism 
release.  
Subtitle B: Emergency Response Employees - Requires the public health 
officer of each State to designate one official or officer of each employer 
of emergency response employees in the State to receive notification and 
make requests.  
Authorizes the Secretary to commence a civil suit to obtain temporary or 
permanent injunctive relief for any violation of these provisions.  (Ryan 
White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, United 
States Congress.) 
 
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
 State and local regulations require the documentation of personal and medical 
history before dispensing medications.  Regulations may be waived in a calamitous event, 
but should be planned for to address smaller scope incidents and provide the highest level 
of first responder personal information protection.   The United States Congress, under 
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the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, regulates first responder 
personal information. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 required the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to establish national standards for 
electronic health care transactions, addressing the security and privacy of health data.  
(http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa). 
In addition, Section 1177 of the Health Information Portability Act (HIPAA) - 
Wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information - lists offenses and 
penalties for misuse of health information. 
SEC. 1177. (a) OFFENSE.--A person who knowingly and in violation of 
this part--"(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;"(2) 
obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an 
individual; or"(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to 
another person, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) PENALTIES.--A person described in subsection (a) shall--"(1) be 
fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or 
both;"(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not 
more than $100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and 
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use 
individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage, 
personal gain, or malicious harm, be fined not more than $250,000, 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. (Health Information Public 
Law 104-191United States Congressional Record, August 21, 1996.) 
 Anytime personal information is documented into medical records, especially 
medical records that will be transported through different agencies, proper handling must 
be used.  Developing a plan that is HIPAA compliant will help avoid costly penalties and 
protect first responder information. 
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III. DEVELOPING A FIRST RESPONDER MASS PROPHYLAXIS 
PLAN 
Once first responder mass prophylaxis requirements are determined, a plan, 
including policies and procedures, must be developed.  The purpose of the plan is to 
serve as a guideline for the community and provide direction and coordination in 
providing mass prophylaxis to first responders and their immediate families.  The plan 
should address the requirements listed in Chapter Two, remain flexible to varying 
causative pathogens and their associated therapeutic recommendations, and adaptable to 
multiple healthcare institutions. 
Current mass prophylaxis plans focus on community preparedness for the general 
public.  These plans use SNS, MMRS caches, Chempacks, and other state and local 
pharmaceutical reserves.  As additional planning has evolved over the past year, more 
references are being made to the need for first responder mass prophylaxis needs, but at 
best, the community plans include special lines or fast tracks away from the general 
public to accommodate first responders at the mass prophylaxis clinic sites.   
It is this author’s recommendation that separate, decentralized first responder 
mass prophylaxis sites are imperative to providing timely protection to our first 
responders, decreasing the out-of-service interval required to dispense the prophylaxis, 
while improving the first responder’s ability to carry out their community mission. 
 
A. DISPENSING PROCEDURE AND PROCESS FLOW 
1. First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Policy 
 The policy for the hospital-based first responder mass prophylaxis plan was to 
offer first responders screening for chemoprophylaxis in a county, state, or federally 
recognized bioterrorism attack. Hospitals would utilize medical screening, aftercare, and 
pharmaceutical agents recommended by the county Emergency Medial Services Agency, 
State  Emergency  Medical  Services,  or  the Center for Disease Control and Prevention  
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(CDC) guidelines.  Hospital, EMS, MMRS, or SNS caches could be used individually, or 
collectively to fulfill initial first responder chemoprophylaxis requirements.  (See 
Attachment 1) 
2. Initiation of the Plan 
The decision to initiate a first responder mass prophylaxis plan is a serious one.  
Multiple levels of consideration need to be addressed.  Besides logistical and financial 
challenges, routine prophylaxis can cause side effects, including anaphylaxis, destruction 
of naturally occurring flora, drug resistance, and even death.  Consideration will only be 
made after a local, state, or federal declaration of prophylaxis recommendation. 
The decision to initiate this first responder mass prophylaxis plan lays with the 
hospital Chief Executive Officer or administrator on call.  A smallpox release would 
require little debate to initiate vaccination procedures for first responders, but a limited 
anthrax release would require more discussion as to the efficacy of widespread, long-term 
chemoprophylaxis with doubtful exposure.  Therefore, the plan recommends the decision 
to activate be made in conjunction with recommendations from the Chief Medical 
Officer, Infection Control Program Director, Pharmacy Director, and the Employee 
Health representative.  (See Figure 2) 
3. Communication 
Open lines of communication are crucial to the plan’s success.  Initial procedures 
include the immediate notification of crucial personnel.  See Figure 1 for a description of 
who is included and how their communication is organized.  Multiple redundant 
communication modes are available. 
 
NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION 





































Hospital CEO or 
Administrator on call 
♦ Chief Medical 
Officer 
♦ Infection Control 
Program Director 
♦ Pharmacy Director  
♦ Employee Health 
♦ Human Resources 
♦ Management Team 
♦ Nursing Supervisors and 
Clinical Coordinators 
♦ Security 
♦ Disaster Coordinator 
♦ Hospital Disaster Support 
Communication System (Ham 
Radio Operators) 
♦ ReddiNet 
♦ City of Anaheim Disaster Manager 
♦ Anaheim Fire EMS Manager 
♦ Anaheim Police Department Homeland Security 
Coordinator 
♦ Care Ambulance Director of Operations 
♦ Orange County EMS Disaster Coordinator
        
       Hospital PBX 
 







 Forms were developed to record information based on local, state, and federal 
documentation requirements.  A log was generated at the clinic registration area that 
listed first responder/immediate family member name, arrival time, and host agency.  In 
addition, each person received a First Responder Health Screening Form.  (See 
Attachment 2) 
 The First Responder Health Screening Form was used to document biographical 
information: 
• Time in 
• Patient Name 
• File number 
• Social Security Number and/or Badge Number 
• Home or Work Address 
• Employer Name 
• Work Phone 
• Contact Phone 
• Age 





• Current Medications 
• Medical Conditions 
• Pregnancy/Breast Feeding/Birth Control 
Consent is an essential section of the First Responder Health Screening Form.  A 
first responder is not required to take recommended prophylaxis. Vaccinations and 
medication regimes are not without side effects and remain a personal choice for each 
recipient.  A dated, witnessed signature signifying informed consent of the first responder 
is completed before the vaccination or medication will be dispensed. 
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Documentation on the First Responder Health Screening Form includes a first 
responder/immediate family member signature acknowledging receipt of the 
medication/vaccination, associated counseling, and aftercare instructions.  The final two 
signatures are for the consulting professional and mass prophylaxis staff ensuring First 
Responder Health Screening Form completion. 
5. Dispensing and Consultation 
To dispense medications the pharmacy must commence the dual operations mode 
plan.  Pharmacy personnel are tasked with transporting packaged chemoprophylaxis 
medications/vaccinations to the Dispensing and Consultation Station and staffing the 
assigned area.  The Board of Pharmacy requires extensive dispensing information and 
consultation documented on the First Responder Health Screening Form.  Information 
includes name, prescription received (either for vaccination or medication), medical 
provider notes and signature, drug name, quantity, strength and dosage form, 
manufacturer, lot number, and expiration. 
6. First Responder Aftercare 
 Once the first responder receives the medication/vaccination, nursing staff 
reviews the form for completeness and accuracy, answer questions, and offer follow-up 
with own provider agency, Public Health Department, or employee health.  Questions 
beyond their scope of practice are referred back to the Physician Screening Station.  
 
B. LOGISTICS 
1. Clinic Staff 
 Physicians, nurses, and pharmacy staff are usually associated with mass 
prophylaxis clinics but it takes a wide variety of personnel to run a successful clinic.  
Chaos and panic are to be expected during a bioterrorism event. Offering expeditious 
prophylaxis not yet available to the general public will increase the need for secrecy and 
site security.  Site security personnel will be responsible for securing access to the mass 
prophylaxis area, posting signage and barriers to limit access to the mass prophylaxis 
clinic.  Signage should be designed that directs targeted population without notifying the 
general public of the clinic purpose.  
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 In addition to security personnel, environmental services will provide tables and 
chairs for the Sign-in Area, Health Screening Station, Physician Screening Station, 
Dispensing and Consultation Station and the Final Instructions and Check-Out Station. 
 Registration personnel are responsible to staff the Sign-in Area, and greet and log- 
in first responders/immediate family members with their name, arrival time, and host 
agency.  The generated log will be given to the Infection Control Nurse for information 
dissemination to designated officers at each agency.  Registration staff will distribute a 
numbered file with CDC information sheets of the specific pathogen/disease, and the 
First Responder Health Screening Form to each first responder or immediate family 
member to assist with personal privacy and help coordinate information. 
 Physicians will staff the Physician Screening Station.  They are responsible to 
review the completed First Responder Health Screening Form and screen for 
contraindications, assist with informed consent, and distribute prescriptions in the form of 
pre-printed prescription labels to qualifying first responders/immediate family members.  
In addition, physician staff will direct those receiving prescriptions to the Dispensing and 
Consultation Station.  Clinic staff will direct participants who do not meet criteria, or 
those who do not wish chemoprophylaxis, to the Questions and Follow-up Station.  (See 
Figure 1) 
The pharmacy will commence dual operations mode, transporting packaged 
chemoprophylaxis medications/vaccines to the Dispensing and Consultation Station.  
They will staff this station, providing the medication/vaccine and consultation as needed. 
Nursing personnel staffs the Question and Follow-up Station, reviewing the First 
Responder Health Screening Form for completeness and accuracy.  Nursing will answer 
questions and ensure follow-up with own provider agency, personal physician,  
Public Health Department, or employee health.  For additional questions they will refer 
the participants back to the Physician Screening Station. 
At the clinic conclusion, Infection Control personnel will use the registration log 
to contact appropriate designated officers at first responder agencies with a list of 
personnel attending the Mass Prophylaxis Clinic, complying with all state and federal 
guidelines for handling personal medical information. 
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Strength: 500 mg tablets      Number four 
Manufacturer: Bayer 
Lot Number: 1234 
Expiration: 5/2005 





Strength: 500MG        Number:  two 
Manufacturer: Tavanic 
Lot Number: 1234 
Expiration: 5/2005 




Medication:  DOXYCLYCLINE 
Strength: 500MG        Number:  four 
Manufacturer:  Pacific 
Lot Number: 1234 
Expiration: 5/2005 
(Simulated Rx and medication for Exercise) 
 
Figure 2.   Preprinted Medication Labels 
 
2. Location 
 Much discussion has ensued on location of mass prophylaxis clinics.  There is no 
argument that large-scale public mass prophylaxis clinics should be located far away 
from hospitals.  In any disaster scenario, hospitals are viewed as safe havens and can be 
easily overwhelmed with the convergence of multitudes of affected and merely worried 
masses.  Often referred to as the “worried well,” this large group of people can exhaust 
critical resources by clogging healthcare systems unnecessarily.   
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 Adding additional patients in the form of first responders and their immediate 
families needing mass prophylaxis can compound the chaos.  Arguments for a non-
hospital based first responder mass prophylaxis clinic site are valid.  Unfortunately, 
finding a site and, more importantly, available staffing, is difficult.  The purpose of 
designing a separate first responder mass prophylaxis clinic is to provide rapid protection 
to first responders so that they can continue with their mission of serving the public.  The 
logistics of creating an off-site clinic location are more challenging and time consuming 
than a hospital-based clinic, delaying required protection. 
Staffing an off-site location is even more problematic in the midst of a disaster.  
Having a hospital-based plan allows access to the different departments needed to staff 
the clinic.  Available staff and resources, including necessary pharmaceuticals, decreases 
the time needed to implement the plan.  The availability decreases the time to 
prophylaxis, and reduces the chance of disease contraction, morbidity and mortality from 
the causative agent. 
A compromise was reached in this mass prophylaxis plan by holding the first 
responder mass prophylaxis clinic in the medical office building adjacent to the hospital.  
The chosen site allowed access to needed personnel while distancing the activity from the 
emergency department and main hospital. 
3. Traffic-flow 
 Regulated traffic-flow through the mass prophylaxis clinic can help improve 
efficiency, avoid security lapses, and provide for privacy when needed.  Separate 
entrances and exits help decrease congestion.  Potential traffic-flow patterns should be 
first developed on paper and then tested for efficiency in exercises to identify potential 
problems and solutions for better throughput.  (See Figure 3) 
 
C. REFERENCE 
 Historically, fear and chaos are hallmark in any disaster scenario, especially one 
that includes bioterrorism agents.  It is important that the recommendations for the 
protection of first responders come from widely accepted and respected sources.  The 
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more accepted the authority used to base recommendations and therapeutic modalities 
upon; the more authorities will be able to mitigate widespread fear.   
This First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Plan relies upon generally accepted 
governmental experts, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 
disease information and recommendations for prophylaxis.  In addition, follow-up 
information is based upon standardized discharge programs used in daily patient care 
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Figure 3.   Mass Prophylaxis Clinic Flow Model 
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ICAL CENTER ANAHEIM MEMORIAL MED
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MANUAL 
 
SUBJECT: Mass Prophylaxis of First Responders  
 
PURPOSE:
in a Bioterrorism Event 
 






. First reA sponder is defined as on-duty fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, 
POLICY
Hospital Disaster Support Communication System volunteers, hospital personnel and 





First responders will be offered screening for chemoprophylaxis in a county, state, or federally 
PROCE URE:
recognized bioterrorism attack, utilizing medical screening, aftercare, and pharmaceutical agents 
as directed by Orange County Emergency Medical Services, State of California Emergency 
Medical Services (EMS), or Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines.  
Hospital, EMS, Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), or Strategic National Stockpile 






A. otification and Activation 
. Initiation of first responder mass prophylaxis will be at the direction of the hospital 
      am Director 
 
. First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Distribution Duties 
   PB : 
and Clinical Coordinators:  Pagers 46352 
d) rity extension: Extension 5150 
nd 44052 
 Radio Operator) 
g) 
dditional Contact Numbers if needed are: 
 ) 765-xxxx  [May also be 
 xxx  [May also be 
 inator: (714) 765-
 
ordinator: (714) 
2.    Security: 
Secure access to the mass prophylaxis area at the basement of the 
b)  mass prophylaxis area 
c) 
 
. Environmental Services: 






ff Sign-in area 









Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or administrator on call.  The decision may be 
made in conjunction with recommendations from: 
a) Chief Medical Officer 
c) Infection Control Progr
d)       Pharmacy Director 
e)       Employee Health  
B
1.   X will notify of First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Clinic
a) AMMC Human Resources 
b) AMMC Management Team 
c) AMMC Nursing Supervisors 
and 46359 
AMMC Secu
e) AMMC Disaster Coordinator: Pager 46396 a
f) Hospital Disaster Support Communication System (Ham




City of Anaheim Disaster Manager: (714
contacted through MetroNet Dispatch (714) 765-xxxx] 
Anaheim Fire Department EMS Manager: (714) 765-x
contacted through MetroNet Dispatch (714) 765-xxxx] 
Anaheim Police Department Homeland Security Coord
xxxx  [May also be contacted at (714) 765-xxxx or (714) 765-xxxx] 
Care Ambulance Director of Operations: (714) 828-xxxx 
 Orange County Emergency Medical Services Disaster Co
834-xxxx.  [May be contacted at (714) 834-xxxx.] 
a) 
Medical Office Building stairwell entrance 
Post signage/barriers limiting access to the
Direct parking  
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a) Provide table a
a. Sign-in area 
b. Health Screening Station
c. Physician Screening Statio
d. Dispensing and Consultation 
e. Final Instructions and Check-out Stati
 
a) Sta
b) Greet and log in firs
c) Distribute CDC information sheet and First Responder Health 
Screening Form to each first responder or immediate family mem








6.    Physician: 
a) Staff Physician Screening Station 
Review completed First Responder Health Screening Form  
ing prescriptions to qualifying first 
n Station.  Direct those not meeting criteria, or those who do 
7.  Nursing: 
a) 
Review first responder Mass Prophylaxis Health Screening Form for 
 
yee health.  For additional questions refer 
8. Department
a) epartment directors and managers will be responsible to notify on-duty 
 chemoprophylaxis screening during a 
9. Infection Co
a) ontact appropriate designated officer personnel at first responder 
s with  
g. 
MMC/MHS: Occupational Health ext. 5285 
MS Manager: (714) 765-xxxx  [May 




 (714) 806-xxxx 
 
AUTHO ITY:
b) Transport packaged chemoprophylaxis medications/vaccinations to the
Dispensing and Co
c) Provide personnel for Dispensing and Consultation Station in 
classroom C/D 
b) 
c) Screen for contraindications, distribut
responders 
d) Direct first responders receiving prescriptions to the Dispensing and 
Consultatio
not wish chemoprophylaxis to the Questions and Follow-up Station. 
Staff Question and Follow-up Station 
b) 
completeness and accuracy 
c) Answer questions and insure follow-up with own provider agency, Public
Health Department, or emplo
back to Physician Screening Station. 
 
 Directors and Managers: 
D
personnel of availability of
bioterrorism attack and relieve staff in small groups to proceed to the 





list of first responders attending Mass Prophylaxis Screenin
 
Contact personnel includes: 
A
Anaheim Fire Department: E
contacted through MetroNet Dispatch (714) 7
 Police Department Homeland Security Coordinator: (714) 765-
xxxx  [May also be contacted at (714) 765-xxxx or (714) 765-xx
 Care Ambulance Nurse Manager: (714) 828-xxxx 
Orange County Fire Department: EMS Coordinator at 714-573-xxxx
 Fullerton Fire Department: EMS Coordinator pager
R    
alifornia Mass Prophylaxis Planning Guide, June 2003. 
. Center for Disease Control and Prevention Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: A 
 
1.         State of C
2
Template for Healthcare Facilities.  Available at www.bt.cdc.gov  
 
3. California Hospital Bioterrorism Response Planning Guide.  California 
Department of Health Services.  Revised May, 2004.   
(Attachment 1) 
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FIRST RESPONDER HEALTH SCREENING FORM 
 
Section 1:  (To be completed by first responder)          Time in: _____________ 
 
Patient Name: __________________________  File Number: ________________ 
 
Social Security Number and/or Badge Number: ____________________________ 
 
Address: Home or Work (circle) ________________________________________ 
 
Employer Name: ____________________________________________________ 
         
Work phone: ____________________  Contact phone: ______________________ 
        cell or home 
Age: ______  Date of Birth:  ______________  Weight:  ______ (lbs)  Gender  M/F 
      mm/dd/yy 
Do you have any allergies?  Yes      No   If yes, list: _________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you take any medications, including over the counter medications?  If yes, list: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Have you ever had any of the following medical conditions? 
 
Asthma/Emphysema/COPD             Yes No            Diabetes      Yes      No 
Stomach Problems   Yes No            Cancer       Yes      No 
Hepatitis/Liver Disease             Yes No            Stroke        Yes      No 
Spleen Removal   Yes No            Seizures      Yes      No 
Organ Transplant   Yes No           HIV/AIDS      Yes      No 
Anemia/Sickle Cell Disease   Yes No           Heart Disease      Yes      No 
Other Problems  ______________________________________________________ 
 
Females only: Date of last menstrual period:  __________  Are you pregnant: Yes  No 
        mm/dd/yy 
Are you breastfeeding: Yes No      Do you use birth control? Hormonal/barrier/other 
 
Section 2: HEALTH SCREENING STATION.  Informed Consent (To be completed 
by first responder) 
“__________________________________________” (I) am seeking medication and or 
vaccination in accordance with current guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) and the Orange County Emergency Medical Services Agency.  I 
have received and read the information sheets about the disease, medication, and/or 
vaccination.  I do / do not (circle once) consent to the treatment prescribed. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Signature (self or guardian)  date  Witness (Printed name/signature) 
26 
Section 3: PHYSICIAN EVALUATION STATION (To be completed by health care 
professional) 
 
Prescription received.            YES   NO     (Circle one) 
 
If yes, list medication or attach sticker below in Section 4 box and direct to 
PRESCRIPTION DISPENSING STATION.   
 
If no proceed to QUESTION AND FOLLOW-UP STATION. 
 




Health Care Professional Printed Name:  _______________  Signature: _____________ 
 







Drug name, quantity, strength, and dosage form: ________________________________ 
 







_____________________________   _____________________________ 
I have received the medication/vaccination    Signature of health care professional   
prescribed as above, and have been counseled                        giving consultation 
on its use. 
 
Section 5: QUESTION AND FOLLOW-UP STATION
 
First Responder Signature                Mass Prophy Staff Signature 
 
 
______________________________                         _____________________________ 
 I have received screening and                                                    Signature                 Date/Time 
will follow-up with my MHS, individual agency, 




IV. IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING A FIRST RESPONDER 
MASS PROPHYLAXIS PLAN 
Developing a plan is an important part to providing prophylaxis to first responders 
in the event of a bioterrorist attack, but the plan must be tested to identify areas of 
improvement, logistical problems, traffic flow impediments, and best practices.  To test 
this thesis a full-scale, multi-agency exercise was designed and implemented.   
 
A. EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS 
Anaheim Fire Department 
Anaheim General Hospital 
Anaheim Memorial Medical Center 
Brea Fire Department 
Care Ambulance  
Fullerton Fire Department 
Hospital Disaster Support Communications System 
Los Alamitos Medical Center 
Orange County Emergency Medical Services 
Orange County Fire Authority 
Orange County Sheriff’s Department Terrorism Early Warning Group 
Placentia Linda Hospital 
Saint Jude Medical Center 
Western Medical Center Anaheim 
West Anaheim Medical Center 
 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE EXERCISE 
 The objectives of the exercise were chosen to validate the ability to provide rapid 
mass prophylaxis to first responders using the guidelines described in the First Responder 
Mass Prophylaxis Policy and Procedure: 
• Determine effectiveness of hospital-based clinic location for meeting 
logistical requirements  
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• Analyze traffic flow pattern and identify bottlenecks 
• Measure first responder throughput times  
• Examine efficacy of position assignments, identifying redundant positions 
or additional assignments that may be needed 
• Determine effectiveness of signage clarity for clinic identification, 
location, traffic flow, station location, and exit 
• Trial paperwork capability in fulfilling regulatory requirements 
• Identify problematic areas of the First Responder Health Screening Form 
for clinic staff and first responder use 
• Determine effectiveness of communication within the hospital 
organization and throughout the varying first responder agencies to notify 
availability, location, and time for prophylaxis clinic 
• Test chosen antibiotics for hospital cache against actual first responder 
health profiles 
• Determine effectiveness of plan adaptability for use with pathogens 
requiring oral chemoprophylaxis and vaccines 
• Assess plan flexibility on a diverse group of hospitals 
• Test reference materials; information fact sheets, and standardized 
aftercare instructions 
• Determine effectiveness of counseling for first responders refusing 
prophylaxis 
 
C. EXERCISE COMPONENTS 
1. Clinic Locations 
a. Objectives 
• Determine effectiveness of hospital-based clinic location for 
meeting logistical requirements 
• Assess plan flexibility for a diverse group of hospitals 
Location of the clinic site is critical to returning first responders back into 
service, minimizing out-of-service time and increasing comfort level during a terrorist 
attack when first responder demands are high. 
Seven Paramedic Receiving Center Hospitals within the Blue/Green 
Disaster Net of Orange County, California were used as test mass prophylaxis clinic sites 
to dispense medications or vaccines to first responders.  The hospitals ranged from small 
community hospitals to mid-sized and larger facilities.  Both non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals participated in the exercise.  (Figure 4.   www.orangecounty.net) 
 
 
Figure 4.   Orange County Map.   
 
First responder knowledge of hospital locations increased comfort level 
and facilitated maneuvering the site.  Experienced with each location’s parking for 
routine delivery of patient care, and education and training, many responded with positive 
comments on ease of clinic access.  There were no comments on inability to locate clinic 
or access parking.  Additionally, the largest group to be prophylaxed was hospital 
personnel.  Unlike other first responders, most hospital personnel are unable to leave the 
campus to receive prophylaxis without abandoning patients.  Locating the clinic adjacent 
to the facility allowed more hospital workers to participate by minimizing out-of-service 
time and negating additional parking needs. 
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The plan demonstrated flexibility as individual hospitals exercised various 
scenarios, from anthrax and pneumonic plaque requiring oral chemoprophylaxis, to viral 
smallpox requiring vaccinia vaccinations.  The First Responder Policy and Procedure 
provided a structure that flexed to accommodate each scenario. 
b. Recommendations 
The artificialities of a full-scale exercise allowed for the large number of 
first responders to be prophylaxed but did not exhibit the volume of “worried well” 
expected in a bioterrorism attack.  Therefore, while locating the clinic adjacent to the 
hospital worked extremely well for the exercise, it would take an actual event to 
determine if the additional demands of the clinic would overwhelm the facility.  In spite 
of the lack of “worried well” to test the location, this author recommends utilizing a 
hospital-based clinic for the identified advantages. 
Blue/Green Net participants discussed developing plans to delineate each 
threatened pathogen, but this exercise demonstrated that one plan capable of flexing to 
meet the needs of multiple scenarios was not only feasible, but practical, in the mass 
prophylaxis setting.    
2. Communication 
a. Objective 
To determine the effectiveness of communication within the hospital 
organization and throughout the varying first responder agencies to notify clinic 
availability, location, and time 
To communicate on the day of the exercise, faxes were sent to stations 
stating that a drill was to take place at the listed hospitals between the hours of 0900 a.m. 
and 1200 p.m. on May 24, 2004 testing the ability to provide mass prophylaxis to first 
responders.  No additional incentives were provided.  Both clinic staff and first 
responders receiving prophylaxis were on-duty first responders to allow testing of the 
system without additional staffing.   
Due to the limited available clinic staff and first responders, the number of 
participants could only be estimated.  Sufficient number of volunteers were needed to test 
the system, but could not be guaranteed until the event was tallied.  Several other 
jurisdictional general public mass prophylaxis exercises recycled victims through their 
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clinics to ensure adequate test volume.  Local Orange County EMS officials identified the 
problem encountered with recycling victims through mapped patterns.  The first time 
volunteers were directed through a general public mass prophylaxis clinic a time standard 
was set.  As the set of volunteers recycled through, the clinic times were shortened as 
they became familiar with procedures, decreasing throughput times.  Therefore, the 
number of victims cycled through this first responder mass prophylaxis clinic was limited 
to the number available.  No personnel would be recycled through a second time. 
Communication utilizing faxes and land-line phone to individual stations 
resulted in over one-thousand first responders volunteering to participate in the exercise.  
Recognizing the important role of communication in any disaster scenario, redundant 
communication methods were used as back up.  Methods included:  
• ReddiNet:  ReddiNet (Rapid Emergency Digital Data Information 
Network) is the 900MHz secure microwave radio system that forms a 
major component in Orange County’s emergency management 
communications system.  Located in all Paramedic Receiving Center 
Hospitals in the county, ReddiNet’s real time data can include hospital 
diversion, public health alerts, and law enforcement updates, providing an 
excellent forum for first responder mass prophylaxis clinic information.  
• 800 MHz Radio:  The 800MHz radios are the non-secure, digital 
countywide coordinated communication system linking fire agencies, 
ambulance providers, hospitals and OCEMS.   
• Ham Radio:  Hospital Disaster Support Communications System 
(HDSCS) is a specialty section of the Amateur Radio Emergency Service 
that handles non-secure overflow or back-up communications to Orange 
County medical facilities via ham radio.  Ham radio operators participated 







Figure 5.    Ham Radio operators 
 
• Cellular and Landline Telephones, Pagers:  Telephones and pagers are 
available with confidential telephone lists distributed to appropriate 
personnel. 
b. Recommendation 
Utilizing commonly used and redundant modes increases the probability 
of effective communication in a disaster.  The more interoperable the communication 
mode with provider agencies, the easier its use.  Law enforcement would benefit from 
joining the ReddiNet Group but were able to communicate with the other methods. 
3. Pharmaceuticals 
a. Objectives 
• Determine effectiveness of pl5n adaptability for use in pathogens 
requiring oral chemoprophylaxis and vaccines 
• Test chosen antibiotics for hospital cache against actual first responder 
health profiles 
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• Determine effectiveness of counseling for first responders refusing 
prophylaxis 
Pharmaceuticals for the clinic were simulated with unit dose bags of 
candy.  Labeling was per State Board of Pharmacy requirements with the disclaimer that 
the candy was a simulation for an exercise.  (See Figure 1) 
Physicians received first responders with forms providing medical history 
and a signed decision/release form stating whether they were accepting or declining the 
prophylaxis.  The physician discussed treatment options and provided a preprinted 
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prescription chosen from the preprinted medication labels or write-in space for additional 
antibiotic choices.  The pre-printed medication labels saved significant time and helped 
ensure regulatory compliance by providing most of the necessary documentation while 
including prompts for the remaining data. 
Although not all diseases will be covered with the limited antibiotic and 
vaccine caches, the first responder mass prophylaxis plan proved adaptable to a host of 
pathogens including anthrax, pneumonic plague, and smallpox.  Each hospital had several 
instances of volunteers choosing not to accept the offered prophylaxis.  The refusals 
required additional first responder counseling and discussion of options.  Some of the 
discussion included allergies, fear of side effects, pregnancy and lactation.  One 
participating hospital included an infectious disease specialist at the Physician Screening 
Station in anticipation of difficult decisions with prophylaxis.  The specialist helped 
avoid bottlenecks by redirecting problematic cases away from the main distribution line. 
b. Recommendations 
• Retain the chosen medications and the adaptable policy. 
• Continue to use pre-printed medication labels. 
The infectious disease specialist at the Physician Screening Station 
assisted throughput time by directing first responders with complicated medical histories 
or increased need away from the fast moving clinic line.  The added physician is needed 




Trial reference materials including information fact sheets, and 
standardized aftercare instructions 
The exercise utilized CDC fact sheets for disease pathogen and 
Micromedix aftercare for medication use and counseling.  Past discussion has included 
storing copies of several potential biological weapons fact sheets and the coordinated 
medication directions.  However, with lessons learned in the 2001 Anthrax Attack it 
became apparent how quickly information changed and stored data became obsolete.   
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CDC fact sheets were downloaded from websites and Micromedix 
software programs on the day of the exercise and copied off for distribution.  Education 
levels varied from housekeepers to department directors, physicians, and battalion chiefs.  
The distributed information appeared to be well-understood by the participants.  
Although a portion of the clinic staff, including physicians, were bilingual, forms were 
printed in English and limited translation was available at the clinic site.  The need for 
additional translation services was identified.   
b. Recommendations 
Provide additional bilingual clinic staff and forms in languages expected 
for area.  (Multilingual Micromedix and CDC fact sheets are available on-line.)   
5. Traffic Flow 
a. Objectives 
• Analyze traffic flow pattern and identify bottlenecks  
• Measure first responder throughput times  
• Determine effectiveness of signage clarity for clinic identification, 
location, traffic flow, station location, and exit 
Traffic flow was diagramed using a direct flow pattern for entrance 
through individual stations and out a separate exit.  Signage directed personnel to a First 
Responder Clinic.  Mass prophylaxis was not listed in the verbiage to allow identification 
of the location without stating the purpose to the general public. 
In addition to signage, directions for clinic flow were included on the First 
Responder Health Screening Form providing routing from Registration through Question 
and Answer Station.  (See Figure 3) 
Identification of clinic bottlenecks was accomplished through direct 
observation.  Discussion included adding time markers for each station, but with budget 
and staffing constraints, hand-written time notations were used only at entry and exit 
portals. 
Throughput time averages were obtained for each hospital.  Total averages 
for the seven participating hospitals were 13.7 minutes.  Throughput times compare 
favorably with other mass prophylaxis clinics.  The numbers are outstanding when it is 
recognized that the time measurement includes all waiting time.  Many mass prophylaxis 
clinics begin time flow studies after participants have waited in extensive lines, often 
greater than an hour.  This exercise measured the time from the time of arrival through 
exit.  This exercise also included extensive information on the disease and recommended 
prophylaxis (medication or vaccination) with opportunity for discussion and follow-up 
with health care experts. 
b. Recommendations 
• Utilize similar time measurements in future exercise, beginning 
time flow study at time of arrival.   
• Continue to include disease and prophylaxis information in clinic 
design. 
6. Clinic Staff 
a. Objectives 
Examine efficacy of position assignments, identifying redundant positions 
or additional assignments that may be needed 
Personnel are assigned in a disaster under the Hospital Emergency 
Incident Command System (HEICS).  Staffing for the clinic followed position guidelines 
as outlined in the First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Policy and Procedure.  Additional 
staff at each station would decrease throughput time but also increase exercise cost.  
(Figure 6) 
  







Future exercises or actual pathogen release could utilize the HEICS Labor 
Pool to provide additional staff to positions as the need is identified through direct 
observation.  Rotating staff throughout participating hospitals could assist relieving staff 
of their patient duties to allow rapid clinic access. 
7. Forms 
a. Objectives 
• Trial paperwork capability in fulfilling regulatory requirements 
• Identify problematic areas of the First Responder Health Screening 
Form for clinic staff and first responder use 
Paperwork included a registration form listing first responder name, 
agency, and arrival time.  The most crucial form was the First Responder Health 
Screening Form.  This form not only documented important health information, but also 
provided direction for both clinic staff and first responders. 
Comments from participants and clinic staff were complimentary of the 
form and its ease of use.  Completing the form was the most labor-intensive part of the 
clinic.  Having the form in alternate languages would have relieved interpreters and 
decreased throughput time. 
b. Recommendations 
Fax, e-mail and hand delivered distribution of the First Responder Health 
Screening Form to first responder locations such as police and fire departments and 
substations, hospital nursing and non-clinical units, and ambulance provider stations will 
allow access to the form prior to arriving at the screening and dispensing sites of the 
clinic, helping decrease throughput times for each first responder. 
Bilingual forms and information fact sheets would decrease translation use 






V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. SUMMARY 
Mass prophylaxis is a costly venture that includes regulatory, personal privacy 
considerations, and a strict adherence to medical guidelines, but the result of not 
providing protection is even more expensive.  Epidemics and pandemics carry a 
horrendous cost in personnel, equipment and supplies, area economics, lost workdays, 
and potentially loss of life.   
The exercise proved the First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Plan to be effective in 
providing rapid protection to first responders.  Over one-thousand first responders 
completed biographical and medical history information, met with physicians for medical 
screening and prophylaxis, received consultation from pharmacists, and finally aftercare 
instructions for continued prophylaxis from their own agencies 
 
B. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In examining the First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Plan the objective is to 
provide an adequate level of protection in the event of a bioterrorism attack so that first 
responders are able to fulfill their daily duties.  The scope of the plan not only includes all 
first responders, law enforcement, fire, ambulance providers, and hospital personnel, but 
also their immediate family members living in the same household.  Since the first 
responders, their immediate families, and the first responder provider agency employers 
are viewed as customers of the jurisdictional plan, prophylaxis plans should address the 
group’s specific needs during development and implementation phases.   
Many factors make the First Responder Mass Prophylaxis Plan a success.  The 
first factor is location.  Community plans call for a centralized location to supply mass 
prophylaxis to hundred of thousands, to millions of people.  The logistics of such a large 
undertaking are enormous.  Parking, crowd control, line management, unfamiliarity with 
pathogens and treatment regimes, multicultural and language needs, and high-risk 
populations, will require much longer intervals and decrease clinic throughput numbers. 
Decentralized first responder mass prophylaxis clinics at local hospitals decreased 
the total number to be prophylaxed at each site, located the screening and dispensing area 
at the work site for a large percentage of the first responders, and positioned it within the 
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work area for the remainder.  This decentralization resulted in the avoidance of out of 
service time and the increase of first responder availability to the community.  Hospital 
locations also presented the first responders a familiar location with familiar staff in a 
very stressful time. 
Developing a first responder mass prophylaxis plan that includes family members 
also increases the chance for success as provisions of protection for first responder 
immediate family hinges on personnel showing up to work.  Less absenteeism by first 
responders during critical periods helps provide coverage to more citizens of the 
community and a more protected first responder work force. 
  Using established hospital sites increased trust and decreased fear.  Locating the 
clinic at the hospital could stress an already impacted healthcare system, but would 
provide the most rapid means to provide protection to first responders.   
The largest and most costly threat in lack of first responder mass prophylaxis 
planning is not providing the protection to first responders.  Leaving them vulnerable to 
the attack pathogen results either in their unavailability to complete the community 
mission as first responders or in their having to work unprotected, risking disease 
contraction and possibly assisting the terrorists in spreading the disease to an even higher 
at-risk population.   
 
C. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis proposed a plan to provide prophylaxis to first responders in the event 
of a bioterrorism attack.  Implementation of the plan to over 1,000 first responders in a 
multi-jurisdictional exercise provided valuable insight into the feasibility of a rapid, 
hospital-based mass prophylaxis clinic and allowed identification of several areas of 
improvement.  Further testing of the plan needs to be done to exercise inclusion of first 
responder’s immediate family members and transportation of SNS and MMRS caches to 
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